113, 563, 575 Southeast Asia ALl

[For information on the origin of the Thien-Ti-Hui Society and the traditional happenings on which the ceremonies are based, see 39: Pickering, ANl Malaya, category 116. --Analyst]

113, 648, 721, 175, 563 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1, Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

113, 563, 575 Southeast Asia ALl

[For information on the initiation ceremony and meeting house of the Ghee Hin Society in Singapore, see 41: Pickering, ANl Malaya, Cat. 116. --Analyst]

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Trade in Fish

228 Apart from that fish eaten fresh on the coasts, the bulk is preserved for commerce and for storing during seasons when the sea is too violent, by sun-drying, salting or by conversion into one of the highly-spiced, partly-fermented fish sauces widely admired by Southeast Asia people (i.e. *blachan* in Malaya, *trassie* in Java, *nuoc mam* in Indochina, *kapi* in Siam, *ngapi* in Burma). Huge quantities of fish in these forms move inland within each country and there has developed a considerable movement of preserved fish between the different Southeast Asia territories, to supply the plantation and industrial workers. From Siam and Indochina alone preserved fish to the value of about $12 million was exported each year before the war. That fish preserving is widely practised even for local use means that the activity is very largely buffered from the alternations of glut and scarcity which are common in fishing industries. The transport of the preserved fish both internally and externally tends to be by sea for cheapness, a paramount consideration in a food for peasants, and because there are few alternatives. Only in a few areas is there a speedy land service able to deliver fresh fish to inland urban centres.

563 228 Commercialisation of fishing has brought in foreign personnel. Whenever fishing is carried on for export as cash sales, Chinese are frequently the principal fishermen, as at Bagansiapiapi (Sumatra) and Pangkor (Malaya), in the deep-sea fishing centred on Singapore (once associated with the Japanese) and even in the cultivation of fish in Javanese ponds. Moreover, Chinese are strongly represented as the middlemen who handle the trade from the actual fisherman to the ultimate consumer, and they are generally responsible for processing the wet fish into transportable forms.

Freshwater Fishing

226 While the absence of deep-sea and mechanical mass fishing methods is one peculiarity of Southeast Asia, equally remarkable is the emphasis on freshwater fishing. Very largely the methods of freshwater fishing—traps and small nets—have established the styles used for inshore sea fishing. For the most part the value of this freshwater production cannot be gauged though it has major importance in local diet. Two variations of freshwater fishing

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have exceptional interest. In Indochina the Tonle Sap fisheries represent the most productive of the natural fresh fisheries, and in Java has been developed a large cultivation of fish in ponds.

From Tonle Sap over 25 tons of fish are produced annually from each square mile of its surface, a productivity ten times greater than that of the well-fished North Sea of Europe, and unique in its intensity. This exceptional production is possible because the large area covered from early June by shallow floods enables fish to spawn profusely in about 3,000 square miles of inundated forest, where abundance of vegetable matter makes the fish grow larger than those in any of the neighbouring rivers. Over 30,000 persons are normally fishing this lake and the full-time fishermen live in villages of pile dwellings scattered round it; of these lake-side fishing villages Snoc Trou is the most important. A considerable number of migrant fishermen, Annamese, Chinese and Malay, move into this area temporarily for the peak fishing season from October to January. Over 135,000 tons of fish are obtained annually and half of this is dried before leaving the region; some fish are sent alive towards the estuary of the Mekong in floating cages of bamboo enclosing what is virtually an artificial shoal moving through the water to the market, an ingenious device for transporting live fish. The commercial side of this fishing is almost entirely Chinese. Over-fishing has been going on in recent years and controls are becoming necessary.

In Java two types of pond fishing have been evolved. Near Batavia, Sourabaya and Semarang where the demand for fish is great, mangrove swamps are partially enclosed to control the tidal water and into the enclosures are placed, between April and July, the spawn and young sea fish gathered among bundles of leaves which fishermen have previously placed in the open sea for the purpose. The spawn and young fish are carried to the fishponds in jars and there left to fatten on algae and water weeds cultivated for them. The milkfish (Chanos chanos) is popular for this purpose and reaches marketable size within a year. Elsewhere inland artificial freshwater ponds have been built, covering a total area estimated at over 100,000 acres, in which fish of the carp type are bred and fattened all the year round; 65,000 tons of fish are obtained every year by this means. Freshwater fisheries are now encouraged in every little tank or pond as a form of mosquito control.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of
439 Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts
648 and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the
177 old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The
• 563 settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people,
648 acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers
177 with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison,
648 for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

7. Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and
177 spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by
648 introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11] It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little
175 177 good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast
439 Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by
648 cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

175 During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500,
648 Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political
[797] connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both
175 the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea
648
563 of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

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11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 with large estates, permanent immigrants of lower rank who
648 married native women, and priests spending a lifetime in
• 563 their parishes. But the colonies were ruled by Governors from Europe. They were both settlers and rulers. The Dutch came merely as traders, but they could obtain tropical produce only in the form of tribute; economic circumstances required them to accept sovereignty on behalf of the home company and to rule the people indirectly through native chieftains, and also to settle permanently, though on a comparatively small scale, to supervise native cultivation. They were primarily rulers and were settlers only by force of circumstance. In the 19th century the English carried the process a stage further. Through the industrial revolution they had goods to sell, and the object of their policy was not tribute but trade. This required direct rule, but not settlement, except in the ports. Finally, with the growth of capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal, the typical system of colonial development was by foreign capital with European management and imported Asian labor. Thus there was a process of development from the old colonial system of foreign settlement without foreign rule to a new system of foreign rule without settlement.[13]

Impact of the Changing Trend of Trade with the West

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177
648 In the nineteenth century, the age-old means of communication between the different parts of Southeast Asia

13. Furnivall, op. cit.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
433 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
438 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
439 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high opera-
648 tional cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.

563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

563 to impress even the most unreflecting sight-seer is the medley of ethnic groups. What is almost equally apparent
563 is that these ethnic groups do not mix. Each has its own
571 quarter, its own temple, its club or other meeting ground for social functions, its own forms and places of entertainment and recreation. They do not meet in these places but only in the market place to make money out of one another or perhaps with one another. They have no common link except in business. What is not quite obvious is that each ethnic group has its own special economic function. There is a plural society with its own distinctive and characteristic plural economy.

563 Typically, a plural society in Southeast Asia com-
565 prises three main sections: the Europeans, constituting an
433 upper class; the foreign orientals, Indian or Chinese, consti-
571 tuting a middle class; and the great mass of the native population in the lower class. The Europeans and foreign orientals are temporary residents, strangers to one another or at best casual acquaintances, and the native community is little more than a crowd of individuals. In the relations between the classes, there are no social ties to dull the edge of economic competition. Within each class, inherited traditions lose their force. Society as a whole is divided into groups; each group is merely a collection of individuals, and in each group life is simplified to an economic struggle for existence. Social life is reduced to its economic content, society is converted into a business concern, and only the

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563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
433 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a
591 few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
171 cultural section of the population. The latest available
433 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent
171 on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

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Chinese Indians

464 167 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could [178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and [668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Caledonia). [166] In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 609 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies.

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina.

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid.

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war.

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun-

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Chinese Indians

464 668 563 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compensated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

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464 668 563 167 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller numbers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining. More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occupations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 668 563 167 468 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so doing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigration. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

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the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expensive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of government-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial relationship which would result from general economic development in the world and specifically from the new role that China and India would inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOR VARIOUS REASONS an organized labor movement has never developed in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, divided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gangster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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Chinese Indians

466 167 grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

466 Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly attempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

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Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

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467 of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

467 The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the governments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were believed to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Communism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

466 Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Em-
467 ployers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In
[563] Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolu-
[648] tions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

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Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in.

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Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated.

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Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas.

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Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese,

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region.

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization.

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can

only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

11: Kynnersley
563, 773, 787

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[For information concerning mythical beings, and the role of dream interpretation in relation to "a description of the Chinese lottery known as Hua-Hoey", see category 116, the entire source.]

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13]

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954.

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually constructed in continuous rows and back to back, this type of tenement is among the more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian cities. On the urban peripheries and wherever interstices appear in the modern street and housing pattern, slum villages appear which consist of house clusters usually constructed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also are found in and on the margins of the lesser cities but are most striking in juxtaposition to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bangkok, and Jakarta.

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A further index of the cultural and economic pluralism of the great cities is their frequent division into old and new towns. In China, especially in the treaty ports, this distinction is usually between an old Chinese and a modern foreign city. The same is true of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is most often between an old and a modern town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a notable degree each of these is also a planned city. In Saigon the contrast is between predominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon itself. In Bangkok, however, there are the old Siamese castle town, a new town of indigenous origin, though of European design, and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen not merely in the division of a city into old and new parts or into quarters but also in the separation of the predominantly outward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

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[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

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504 361 world's great ports and the most Western of the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by [175] Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It [508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction north- [368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The ● 563 oldest section of the city, however, has become the business center, but the rest of the older town is a densely populated Chinese section, and much of the newer town to the northeast also is Chinese. Each of these areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chinese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
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Bangkok

On the other hand, changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

[i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
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On the other hand, the war also brought increased American influence into the region, and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of the symbols of change that sooner or later will be followed by changes in urban facilities and urban organization.

More important, the present period is associated with an increasing intensification of the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enterprise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

●563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants
578 too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALI Southeast Asia ALI
Malaya

real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair proportion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.